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Abstract
Robustness of machine learning models to various adversarial and non-adversarial corruptions continues
to be of interest. In this paper, we introduce the notion of the boundary thickness of a classifier, and
we describe its connection with and usefulness for model robustness. Thick decision boundaries lead
to improved performance, while thin decision boundaries lead to overfitting (e.g., measured by the
robust generalization gap between training and testing) and lower robustness. We show that a thicker
boundary helps improve robustness against adversarial examples (e.g., improving the robust test accuracy
of adversarial training) as well as so-called out-of-distribution (OOD) transforms, and we show that many
commonly-used regularization and data augmentation procedures can increase boundary thickness. On
the theoretical side, we establish that maximizing boundary thickness during training is akin to the
so-called mixup training. Using these observations, we show that noise-augmentation on mixup training
further increases boundary thickness, thereby combating vulnerability to various forms of adversarial
attacks and OOD transforms. We can also show that the performance improvement in several lines of
recent work happens in conjunction with a thicker boundary.
1 Introduction
Recent work has re-highlighted the importance of various forms of robustness of machine learning models. For
example, it is by now well known that by modifying natural images with barely-visible perturbations, one can
get neural networks to misclassify images [1–4]. Researchers have come to call these slightly-but-adversarially
perturbed images adversarial examples. As another example, it has become well-known that, even aside from
such worst-case adversarial examples, neural networks are also vulnerable to so-called out-of-distribution
(OOD) transforms [5], i.e., those which contain common corruptions and perturbations that are frequently
encountered in natural images. These topics have received interest because they provide visually-compelling
examples that expose an inherent lack of stability/robustness in these already hard-to-interpret models [6–12],
but of course similar concerns arise in other less visually-compelling situations.
In this paper, we study neural network robustness through the lens of what we will call boundary thickness,
a new and intuitive concept that we introduce. Boundary thickness can be considered a generalization of the
standard margin, used in max-margin type learning [13–15]. Intuitively speaking, the boundary thickness
of a classifier measures the expected distance to travel along line segments between different classes across
a decision boundary. We show that thick decision boundaries have a regularization effect that improves
robustness, while thin decision boundaries lead to overfitting and reduced robustness. We also illustrate that
the performance improvement in several lines of recent work happens in conjunction with a thicker boundary,
suggesting the utility of this notion more generally.
More specifically, for adversarial robustness, we show that five commonly used ways to improve robustness
can increase boundary thickness and reduce the robust generalization gap (which is the difference between
robust training accuracy and robust test accuracy) during adversarial training. We also show that trained
networks with thick decision boundaries tend to be more robust against OOD transforms. We focus on mixup
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training [16], a recently-described regularization technique that involves training on data that have been
augmented with pseudo-data points that are convex combinations of the true data points. We show that
mixup improves robustness to OOD transforms, while at the same time achieving a thicker decision boundary.
In fact, the boundary thickness can be understood as a dual concept to the mixup training objective, in the
sense that the former is maximized as a result of minimizing the mixup loss. In contrast to measures like
margin, boundary thickness is easy to measure, and (as we observe through counter examples) boundary
thickness can differentiate neural networks of different robust generalization gap, while margin cannot.
For those interested primarily in training, our observations also lead to novel training procedures.
Specifically, we design and study a novel noise-augmented extension of mixup, referred to as noisy mixup,
which augments the data through a mixup with random noise, to improve robustness to image imperfections.
We show that noisy mixup thickens the boundary, and thus it significantly improves robustness, including
black/white-box adversarial attacks, as well as OOD transforms.
In more detail, here is a summary of our main contributions.
• We introduce the concept of boundary thickness (Section 2), and we illustrate its connection to various
existing concepts, including showing that as a special case it reduces to margin.
• We demonstrate empirically that a thin decision boundary leads to poor adversarial robustness as well as
poor OOD robustness (Section 3), and we evaluate the effect of model adjustments that affect boundary
thickness. In particular, we show that five commonly used regularization and data augmentation
schemes (`1 regularization, `2 regularization, large learning rate [17], early stopping, and cutout [18])
all increase boundary thickness and reduce overfitting of adversarially trained models (measured by the
robust accuracy gap between training and testing). We also show that boundary thickness outperforms
margin as a metric in measuring the robust generalization gap.
• We show that our new insights on boundary thickness makes way for the design of new robust training
schemes (Section 4). In particular, we designed a noise-augmentation training scheme that we call
noisy mixup to increase boundary thickness and improve the robust test accuracy of mixup for both
adversarial examples and OOD transforms. We also show that mixup achieves the minimax decision
boundary thickness, providing a theoretical justification for both mixup and noisy mixup.
Overall, our main conclusion is the following.
Boundary thickness is a reliable and easy-to-measure metric that is associated with model robustness,
and training a neural network while ensuring a thick boundary can improve robustness in various
ways that have received attention recently.
Related work. Both adversarial robustness [1–4, 6–8, 11] and OOD robustness [5, 9, 19–21] have been
well-studied in the literature. From a geometric perspective, one expects robustness of a machine learning
model to relate to its decision boundary. In [1], the authors claim that adversarial examples arise from
the linear nature of neural networks, hinting at the relationship between decision boundary and robustness.
In [22], the authors provide the different explanation that the decision boundary is not necessarily linear, but
it tends to lie close to the “data sub-manifold.” This explanation is supported by the idea that cross-entropy
loss leads to poor margins [23]. Some other works also study the connection between geometric properties
of a decision boundary and the robustness of the model, e.g., on the boundary curvature [24,25]. Another
related line of recent work points out that the inductive bias of neural networks towards “simple functions”
may have a negative effect on network robustness [26], though being useful to explain generalization [27,28].
These papers support our observation that natural training tends to generate simple, thin, but easy-to-attack
decision boundaries, while avoiding thicker more robust boundaries.
Mixup is a regularization technique introduced by [16]. In mixup, each sample is obtained from two samples
x1 and x2 using a linear combination x = tx1 + (1− t)x2, with some random t ∈ (0, 1). The label y is similarly
obtained by a linear combination. Mixup has been successfully combined with other data augmentations to
improve accuracy. For instance, [29] uses mixup to interpolate adversarial examples to improve adversarial
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robustness. The authors in [9] mix images augmented with various forms of transformations with a smoothness
training objective to improve OOD robustness. Compared to these prior works, the extended mixup with
simple noise-image augmentation studied in our paper is motivated from the perspective of decision boundaries;
and it provides a concrete explanation for the performance improvement, as regularization is introduced by a
thicker boundary. Another recent paper [30] also shows the importance of reducing overfitting in adversarial
training, e.g., using early stopping, which we also demonstrate as one way to increase boundary thickness.
2 Boundary Thickness
In this section, we introduce boundary thickness and discuss its connection with related notions.
2.1 Boundary thickness
Consider a classification problem with C classes on the domain space of data X . Let f(x) : X → [0, 1]C be
the prediction function, so that f(x)i for class i ∈ [C] represents the posterior probability Pr(y = i|x), where
(x, y) represents a feature vector and response pair. Clearly,
∑C−1
i=0 f(x)i = 1,∀x ∈ X . For neural networks,
the function f(x) is the output of the softmax layer. In the following definition, we quantify the thickness of
a decision boundary by measuring the posterior probability difference gij(x) = f(x)i− f(x)j on line segments
connecting pairs of points (xr, xs) ∈ X (where xr, xs are not restricted to the training set).
Definition 1 (Boundary Thickness). For α, β ∈ (−1, 1) and a distribution p over pairs of points (xr, xs) ∼ p,
let the predicted labels of xr and xs be i and j respectively. Then, the boundary thickness of a prediction
function f(·) is
Θ(f, α, β, p) = E(xr,xs)∼p
[
‖xr − xs‖
∫ 1
0
I{α < gij(x(t)) < β}dt
]
, (1)
where gij(x) = f(x)i − f(x)j, I{·} is the indicator function, and x(t) = txr + (1− t)xs, t ∈ [0, 1].
Intuitively, boundary thickness captures the distance between two level sets gij(x) = α and gij(x) = β by
measuring the expected gap on random line segments in X . See Figure 1a. Note that in addition to the two
constants, α and β, Definition 1 of boundary thickness requires one to specify a distribution p to choose pairs
of points (xr, xs). We show that specific instances of p recovers margin (Section 2.2) and mixup regularization
(Section A). For the rest of the paper, we set p as follows. Choose xr uniformly at random from the training
set. Denote i its predicted label. Then, choose xs to be an `2 adversarial example generated by attacking xr
to a random target class j 6= i. We first look at a simple example on linear classifiers to illustrate the concept.
Example 1 (Binary Linear Classifier). Consider a binary linear classifier, with weights w and bias b. The
prediction score vector is f(x) = [f(x)0, f(x)1] = [σ(w>x+ b), 1− σ(w>x+ b)], where σ(·) : R→ [0, 1] is the
sigmoid function. In this case, measuring thickness in the `2 adversarial direction means that we choose xr
and xs such that xs − xr = cw, c ∈ R. In the following proposition, we quantify the boundary thickness for a
binary linear classifier. (See Section B.1 for the proof.)
Proposition 2.1 (Boundary Thickness of Binary Linear Classifier). Let g˜(·) := 2σ(·) − 1. If [α, β] ⊂
[g01(xr), g01(xs)], then the thickness of the binary linear classifier is given by:
Θ(f, α, β) = (g˜−1(β)− g˜−1(α))/‖w‖. (2)
Note that xs and xr should be chosen such that the condition [α, β] ⊂ [g01(xr), g01(xs)] in Proposition
2.1 is satisfied. Otherwise, for linear classifiers, the segment between xr and xs is not long enough to span
the gap between the two level sets g01(x) = α and g01(x) = β and cannot simultaneously intersect the two
level sets.
For a pictorial illustration of why boundary thickness should be related to robustness and why a thicker
boundary should be desirable, see Figures 1b and 1c. The three curves in each figure represent the three level
sets g01(x) = α, g01(x) = 0, and g01(x) = β. The thinner boundary in Figure 1b easily fits the narrow space
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Figure 1: Main intuition behind boundary thickness. (a) Boundary thickness measures the gap between
two level sets g01(x) = α and g01(x) = β along the adversarial direction. (b) A thin boundary easily fits
into the narrow space between two different classes, but it is not robust. (c) A thick boundary is harder to
achieve a small loss, but it achieves higher robustness. In these two toy settings, the margin is the same, but
choosing a thicker boundary leads to better robustness. (d) The figure illustrates the relationship between
boundary thickness and margin.
between two different classes, but it is easier to attack. The thicker boundary in Figure 1c, however, is harder
to fit data with a small loss, but it is also more robust and harder to attack. To further justify the intuition,
we provide an additional example in Section C. Note that the intuition discussed here is reminiscent of max
margin optimization, but it is in fact more general. In Section, 2.2, we highlight differences between the
two concepts (and later, in Section 3.3, we also show that margin is not a particularly good indicator of
robust performance).
2.2 Boundary thickness generalizes margin
We first show that boundary thickness reduces to margin in the special case of binary linear SVM. We then
extend this result to general classifiers.
Example 2 (Support Vector Machines). As an application of Proposition 2.1, we can compute the boundary
thickness of a binary SVM, which we show is equal to the margin. Suppose we choose α and β to be the
values of g˜(u) evaluated at two support vectors, i.e., at u = w>x + b = −1 and u = w>x + b = 1. Then,
g˜−1(α) = −1 and g˜−1(β) = 1. Thus, from (2), we obtain (g˜−1(β) − g˜−1(α))/‖w‖ = 2/‖w‖, which is the
(input-space) margin of an SVM.
We can also show that the reduction to margin applies to more general classifiers. Let S(i, j) = {x ∈ X :
f(x)i = f(x)j} denote the decision boundary between classes i and j. The (input-space) margin [13] of f on
a dataset D = {xk}n−1k=0 is defined as
Margin(D, f) = min
k
min
j 6=yk
‖xk − Proj(xk, j)‖, (3)
where Proj(x, j) = arg minx′∈S(ix,j) ‖x′ − x‖ is the projection onto the decision boundary S(ix, j). See
Figure 1b and 1c.
Boundary thickness for the case when α = 0, β = 1, and when p is so chosen that xs is the projection
Proj(xr, j) for the worst case class j, reduces to margin. See Figure 1d for an illustration of this relationship
for a two-class problem. Note that the left hand side of (4) is a “worst-case” version of the boundary thickness
in (1). This can be formalized in the following proposition. (See Section B.2 for the proof.)
Proposition 2.2 (Margin is a Special Case of Boundary Thickness). Choose xr as an arbitrary point in the
dataset D = {xk}n−1k=0 , with predicted label i = arg maxl f(x)l. For another class j 6= i, choose xs = Proj(xr, j).
Then,
min
xr
min
j 6=i
‖xr − xs‖
∫ 1
0
I{α < gij(x(t)) < β}dt = Margin(D, f). (4)
Remark 1 (Margin versus Thickness as a Metric). It is often impractical to compute the margin for
general nonlinear functions. On the other hand, as we illustrate below, measuring boundary thickness is
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straightforward. As noted by [16], using mixup tends to make a decision boundary more “linear,” which helps
to reduce unnecessary oscillations in the boundary. As we show in Section 4.1, mixup effectively makes the
boundary thicker. This effect is not directly achievable by increasing margin.
2.3 A thick boundary mitigates boundary tilting
Boundary tilting was introduced by [22] to capture the idea that for many neural networks the decision
boundary “tilts” away from the max-margin solution and instead leans towards a “data sub-manifold,” which
then makes the model less robust. Define the cosine similarity between two vectors a and b as:
Cosine Similarity(a, b) = |a>b|/(‖a‖2 · ‖b‖2). (5)
For a dataset D = {(xi, yi)}i∈I , in which the two classes {xi ∈ D : yi = 1} and {xi ∈ D : yi = −1} are
linearly separable, boundary tilting can be defined as the worse-case cosine similarity between a classifier w
and the hard-SVM solution w∗ := arg min ‖v‖2 s.t. yiv>xi ≥ 1,∀i ∈ I:
T (u) := min
v s.t. ‖v‖2=u and yiv>xi≥1,∀i
Cosine Similarity(v, w∗), (6)
which is a function of the u in the `2 constraint ‖v‖2 = u. In the following proposition, we formalize the idea
that boundary thickness tends to mitigate tilting. (See Section B.3 for the proof; and see also Figure 1b.)
Proposition 2.3 (A Thick Boundary Mitigates Boundary Tilting). The worst-case boundary tilting T (u) is
a non-increasing function of u.
A smaller cosine similarity between the w and the SVM solution w∗ corresponds to more tilting. From
Proposition 2.1, for a linear classifier, we know that u = ‖w‖2 is inversely proportional to thickness. Thus,
T (u) is a non-decreasing function in thickness. That is, a thicker boundary leads to a larger T (u), which
means the worst-case boundary tilting is mitigated. We demonstrate Proposition 2.3 on the more general
nonlinear classifiers in Section D.
3 Boundary Thickness and Robustness
In this section, we measure the change in boundary thickness by slightly altering the training algorithm in
various ways, and we illustrate the corresponding change in robust accuracy. We show that across many
different training schemes, boundary thickness corresponds strongly with model robustness. We observe
this correspondence for both non-adversarial as well as adversarial training. We also present a use case
illustrating why using boundary thickness rather than margin as a metric for robustness is useful. More
specifically, we show that a thicker boundary reduces overfitting in adversarial training, while margin is
unable to differentiate different levels of overfitting.
3.1 Non-adversarial training
Here, we compare the boundary thicknesses and robustness of models trained with three different schemes on
CIFAR10, namely training without weight decay, training with standard weight decay, and mixup training [16].
Note that these three training schemes impose increasingly stronger regularization. We use different neural
networks, including ResNets, VGGs, and DenseNet.1 All models are trained with the same initial learning
rate of 0.1. At both epoch 100 and 150, we reduce the current learning rate by a factor of 10. The thickness
of the decision boundary is measured as described in Section 2 with α = 0 and β = 0.75. When measuring
thickness on the adversarial direction, we use an `2 PGD-20 attack with size 1.0 and step size 0.2. The results
are shown in Figure 2a.
1The models in Figure 2 are from https://github.com/kuangliu/pytorch-cifar/blob/master/models/resnet.py.
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(a) Thickness: mixup > normal training > training without weight decay. After learning rate decays (at both epoch
100 and 150), decision boundaries get thinner.
(b) OOD robustness: mixup > normal training > training without weight decay. Compare with Figure 2a to see
that mixup increases thickness, while training without weight decay reduces thickness.
Figure 2: OOD robustness and thickness. OOD robustness improves with increasing boundary thickness
for a variety of neural networks trained on CIFAR10. “Normal” means training with standard weight decay
5e-4, and “no decay” means training without weight decay. Mixup uses the recommended weight decay 1e-4.
From Figure 2a, we see that the thickness of mixup is larger than that of training with standard weight
decay, which is in turn larger than that of training without weight decay. From the thickness drop at epochs
100 and 150, we conclude that learning rate decay reduces the boundary thickness. Then, we compare the
OOD robustness for the three training procedures on the same set of trained networks. For OOD transforms,
we follow the setup in [31], and we evaluate the trained neural networks on CIFAR10-C, which contains 15
different types of corruptions, including noise, blur, weather, and digital corruption. From Figure 2b, we
see that the OOD robustness corresponds to boundary thickness across different training schemes for all the
tested networks.
See Section E.1 on more details of the experiment. See Section E.2 on a discussion of why the adversarial
direction is preferred in measuring thickness. See Section E.3 on a thorough ablation study of the hyper-
parameters, such as α and β, and on the results of two other datasets, namely CIFAR100 and SVHN. See
Section E.4 for a visualization of the decision boundaries of normal versus mixup training, which shows that
mixup indeed achieves a thicker boundary.
3.2 Adversarial training
Here, we compare the boundary thickness of adversarially trained neural networks in different training settings.
More specifically, we study the effect of five regularization and data augmentation schemes, including large
initial learning rate, `2 regularization (weight decay), `1 regularization, early stopping, and cutout. We choose
a variety of hyper-parameters and plot the robust test accuracy versus thickness. We only choose hyper-
parameters such that the natural training accuracy is larger than 90%. We also plot the robust generalization
gap versus thickness. See Figure 3a and Figure 3b. We again observe a similar correspondence—the robust
generalization gap reduces with increasing thickness.
Experimental details. In our experiments, we train a ResNet18 on CIFAR10. In each set of experiments,
we only change one parameter. In the standard setting, we follow convention and train with learning rate
0.1, weight decay 5e-4, attack range  = 8 pixels, 10 iterations for each attack, and 2 pixels for the step-size.
Then, for each set of experiments, we change one parameter based on the standard setting. For `2, `1 and
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Adversarial robustness and thickness. (a) Increasing boundary thickness improves robust
accuracy in adversarial training. (b) Increasing boundary thickness reduces overfitting (measured by robust
accuracy gap between training and testing). (c) Thickness can differentiate models of different robust levels
(dark to light blue), while margin cannot (dark to light red and dark to light green).
cutout, we only use one of them at a time to separate their effects. See Section F.1 for the details of these
hyper-parameters. Specifically, see Figure 14 which shows that all the five regularization and augmentation
schemes increase boundary thickness. We train each model for enough time (400 epochs) to let both the
accuracy curves and the boundary thickness stabilize, and to filter out the effect of early stopping. In Section
F.2, we reimplement the whole procedure with the same early stopping at 120 epochs and learning rate decay
at epoch 100. We show that the positive correspondence between robustness and boundary thickness remains
the same (see Figure 15). In Section F.3, we provide an ablation study on the hyper-parameters in measuring
thickness and again show the same correspondence for the other settings (see Figure 16).
3.3 Boundary thickness versus margin
Here, we compare margin versus boundary thickness at differentiating robustness levels. See Figure 3c, where
we sort the different models shown in Figure 3a by robustness, and we plot their thickness measurements
using gradually darker colors. We see that while boundary thickness correlates well with robustness and
hence can differentiate different robustness levels, margin is not able to do this.
From (3), we see that computing the margin requires computing the projection Proj(xr, j), which is
intractable for general nonlinear functions. Thus, we approximate the margin on the direction of an adversarial
attack (which is the projection direction for linear classifiers). Another important point here is that we
compute the average margin for all samples in addition to the minimum (worst-case) margin in Definition 3.
The minimum margin is almost zero in all cases due to the existence of certain samples that are extremely
close to the boundary. That is, the standard (widely used) definition of margin performs even worse.
4 Applications of Boundary Thickness
Figure 4: Noisy mi-
uxp thickens the deci-
sion boundary.
Our insights allow us to devise new training schemes, as well as to explain the
robustness phenomenons discovered in some contemporary work, when viewed
through the connection between thickness and robustness.
4.1 Noisy mixup
Motivated by the success of mixup [16] and our insights into boundary thickness,
we introduce and evaluate a training scheme called noisy-mixup.
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Dataset Method OOD Black-box PGD-20
8-pixel 6-pixel 4-pixel
Cifar10 Mixup 78.5±0.4 46.3±1.4 2.0±0.1 3.2±0.1 6.3±0.1
Noisy mixup 83.6±0.3 78.0±1.0 11.7±3.3 16.2±4.2 25.7±5.0
Cifar100 Mixup 51.3±0.4 37.3±1.1 0.0±0.0 0.0±0.0 0.1±0.0
Noisy mixup 52.5±0.7 60.1±0.3 1.5±0.2 2.6±0.1 6.7±0.9
Table 1: Mixup and noisy mixup. The robust test accuracy of noisy mixup is significantly higher than
ordinary mixup. Results are reported for the best learning rate in [0.1, 0.03, 0.01].
Theoretical justification. Before presenting noisy mixup, we strengthen the connection between
mixup and boundary thickness by stating that the model which minimizes the mixup loss also achieves
optimal boundary thickness in a minimax sense. Specifically, we can prove the following: For a fixed
arbitrary integer c > 1, the model obtained by mixup training achieves the minimax boundary thickness, i.e.,
fmixup(x) = arg maxf(x) min(α,β) Θ(f), where the minimum is taken over all possible pairs of (α, β) ∈ (−1, 1)
such that β − α = 1/c, and the max is taken over all prediction functions f such that ∑i f(x)i = 1. See
Section A for the formal theorem statement and proof.
Ordinary mixup thickens decision boundary by mixing different training samples. The idea of noisy mixup,
on the other hand, is to thicken the decision boundary between clean samples and arbitrary transformations.
This increases the robust performance on OOD images, for example on images that have been transformed
using a noise filter or a rotation. Interestingly, pure noise turns out to be good enough to represent such
arbitrary transformations. So, while the ordinary mixup training obtains one mixup sample x by linearly
combining two data samples x1 and x2, in noisy-mixup, one of the combintions of x1 and x2, with some
probability p, is replaced by an image that consists of random noise. The label of the noisy image is “NONE.”
Specifically, in the CIFAR10 dataset, we let the “NONE” class be the 11th class. Note that this method is
different than common noise augmentation because we define a new class of pure noise, and we mix it with
ordinary samples.
The comparison between the noisy mixup and ordinary mixup training is shown in Table 1. For OOD
accuracy, we follow [9] and use both CIFAR-10C and CIFAR-100C. For PGD attack, we use an `∞ attack
with 20 steps and with step size being 1/10 of the attack range. We report the results of three different attack
ranges, namely 8-pixel, 6-pixel, and 4-pixel. For black-box attack, we use ResNet-110 to generate the transfer
attack. The other parameters are the same with the 8-pixel white-box attack. For each method and dataset,
we run the training procedures with three learning rates (0.01, 0.03, 0.1), each for three times, and we report
the mean and standard deviation of the best performing learning rate. See Section G for more details of
the experiment.
From Table 1, we see that noisy mixup significantly improves the robust accuracy of different types of
corruptions. In Figure 4, we show that noisy mixup indeed achieves a thicker boundary than ordinary mixup.
We use pure noise to represent OOD, but this simple choice already shows a significant improvement in both
OOD and adversarial robustness. This opens the door to devising new mechanisms with the goal of increasing
boundary thickness to increase robustness against other forms of image imperfections and/or attacks.
4.2 Explaining robustness phenomena using boundary thickness
Robustness to image saturation. We study the connection between boundary thickness and the saturation-
based perturbation [32]. In [32], the authors show that adversarial training can bias the neural network
towards “shape-oriented” features and reduce the reliance on “texture-based” features. One result in [32]
shows that adversarial training outperforms normal training when the saturation on the images is high. In
Figure 5a, we show that boundary thickness measured on saturated images in adversarial training is indeed
higher than that in normal training.2
A thick boundary reduces non-robust features. We illustrate the connection to non-robust features,
2We use the online implementation in https://github.com/PKUAI26/AT-CNN.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: Explaining robustness phenomenons. (a) The robustness improvement of adversarial training
against saturation-based perturbation (studied in [32]) can be explained by a thicker boundary. (b)-(c)
Re-implementing the non-robust feature experiment protocol with different training schemes. The two figures
show that a thick boundary reduces non-robust features.
proposed by [33] to explain the existence of adversarial examples. The authors show, perhaps surprisingly,
that a neural network trained on data that is completely mislabeled through adversarial attacks can achieve
nontrivial generalization accuracy on the clean test data (see Section H for the experimental protocols of [33]
which we use.) They attribute this behavior to the existence of non-robust features which are essential for
generalization but at the same time are responsible for adversarial vulnerability.
We show that the generalization accuracy defined in this sense decreases if the classifier used to generate
adversarial examples has a thicker decision boundary. In other words, a thicker boundary removes more
non-robust features. We consider four settings in CIFAR10: (1) training without weight decay; (2) training
with the standard weight decay 5e-4; (3) training with the standard weight decay but with a small learning
rate 0.003; and (4) training with mixup. See Figures 5b and 5c for a summary of the results. Looking at these
two figures together, we see that an increase in the boundary thickness through different training schemes
reduces the generalization accuracy, as defined above, and hence the amount of non-robust features retained.
Note that the natural test accuracy of the four source networks cannot explain the difference in Figure 5b,
which are 0.943 (“normal”), 0.918 (“no decay”), 0.899 (“small lr”), and 0.938 (“mixup”). For instance, training
with no weight decay has the highest generalization accuracy defined in the sense above, but its natural
accuracy is only 0.918.
5 Conclusions
We introduce boundary thickness, a more robust notion of the size of the decision boundary of a machine
learning model, and we provide a range of theoretical and empirical results illustrating its utility. This
includes that a thicker decision boundary reduces overfitting in adversarial training, and that it can improve
both adversarial robustness and OOD robustness. Thickening the boundary can also reduce boundary tilting
and the reliance on “non-robust features.” We apply the idea of thick boundary optimization to propose noisy
mixup, and we empirically show that using noisy mixup improves robustness. We also show that boundary
thickness reduces to margin in a special case, but in general it can be more useful than margin. Finally, we
show that the concept of boundary thickness is theoretically justified, by proving that boundary thickness
reduces the worst-case boundary tilting and that mixup training achieves the minimax thickness. Having
proved a strong connection between boundary thickness and robustness, we expect that further studies can
be conducted with thickness and decision boundaries as their focus.
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Appendix
A Mixup Increases Thickness
In this section, we show that mixup as well as the noisy mixup scheme studied in Section 4.1 increase
boundary thickness.
Recall that xr and xs in (1) are not necessaraily from the training data. For example, xr and/or xs can
be the noisy samples used in the noisy mixup (Section 4.1). We make the analysis more general here because
in different extensions of mixup [9, 16, 29], the mixed samples can either come from the training set, from
adversarial examples constructed from the training set, or from carefully augmented samples using various
forms of image transforms.
We consider binary classification and study the unnormalized empirical version of (1) defined as follows:
Θ(f, α, β) :=
∑
(xi,xj) s.t. yi 6=yj
‖xr − xs‖
∫
t∈[0,1]
I{α < g01(x(t)) < β}dt, (7)
where the expectation in (1) is replaced by its empirical counterpart. We now show that the function which
achieves the minimum mixup loss is also the one that achieves minimax thickness for binary classification.
Proposition A.1 (Mixup Increases Boundary Thickness). For binary classification, suppose there exists a
function fmixup(x) that achieves exactly zero mixup loss, i.e., on all possible pairs of points ((xr, yr), (xs, ys)),
fmixup(λxr + (1 − λ)xs) = λyr + (1 − λ)ys for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, for an arbitrary fixed integer c > 1,
fmixup(x) is also a solution to the following minimax problem:
arg max
f
min
(α,β)
Θ(f, α, β), (8)
where the boundary thickness Θ is defined in Eqn. (7), the maximization is taken over all the 2D functions
f(x) = [f(x)0, f(x)1] such that f(x)0 + f(x)1 = 1 for all x, and the minimization is taken over all pairs of
α, β ∈ (−1, 1) such that β − α = 1/c.
Proof. See Section B.4 for the proof.
Remark 2 (Why Mixup is Preferred among Different Thick-boundary Solutions). Here, we only prove that
mixup provides one solution, instead of the only solution. For example, between two samples xr and xs that
have different labels, a piece-wise 2D linear mapping that oscillates between [0, 1] and [1, 0] for more than once
can achieve the same thickness as that of a linear mapping. However, a function that exhibits unnecessary
oscillations becomes less robust and more sensitive to small input perturbations. Thus, the linear mapping
achieved by mixup is preferred. According to [16], mixup can also help reduce unnecessary oscillations.
Remark 3 (Zero Loss in Proposition A.1). Note that the function fmixup(x) in the proposition is the one
that perfectly fits the mixup augmented dataset. In other words, the theorem above needs fmixup(x) to have
“infinite capacity,” in some sense, to match perfectly the response on line segments that connect pairs of
points (xr, xs). If such fmixup(x) does not exist, it is unclear if an approximate solution achieves minimax
thickness, and it is also unclear if minimizing the cross-entropy based mixup loss is exactly equivalent to
minimizing the minimax boundary thickness for the same loss value. Nonetheless, our experiments show that
mixup consistently achieves thicker decision boundaries than ordinary training (see Figure 2a).
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Choose (xr, xs) so that xs − xr = cw. The thickness of f defined in (1) becomes
Θ(f, α, β, xs, xr) = c‖w‖Ep
[∫ 1
0
I{α < g01(x(t)) < β}dt
]
. (9)
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Define a substitute variable u as:
u = tw>xr + (1− t)w>xs + b. (10)
Then,
du = (w>xr − w>xs)dt = w>(−cw)dt = −c‖w‖2dt. (11)
Further,
f(txr + (1− t)xs)0 − f(txr + (1− t)xs)1 = 2σ(tw>xr + (1− t)w>xs + b)− 1 = 2σ(u)− 1 = g˜(u). (12)
Thus,
Θ(f, α, β, p)
(a)
= c‖w‖E
[∫ 1
0
I{α < f(txr + (1− t)xs)0 − f(txr + (1− t)xs)1 < β}dt
]
(b)
=E
[∫ w>xr+b
w>xs+b
I{α < g˜(u) < β}
(
− 1‖w‖
)
du
]
(c)
=
1
‖w‖E
[∫ w>xs+b
w>xr+b
I{α < g˜(u) < β}du
]
,
(13)
where (a) holds because g01(x(t)) = f(x(t))0 − f(x(t))1 = f(txr + (1 − t)xs)0 − f(txr + (1 − t)xs)1, (b) is
from substituting u = tw>xr + (1 − t)w>xs + b and du = −c‖w‖2dt, and (c) is from switching the upper
and lower limit of the integral to get rid of the negative sign. Recall that g˜(u) is a monotonically increasing
function in u. Thus,
Θ(f, α, β, p) =
1
‖w‖
∫ w>xs+b
w>xr+b
I{g˜−1(α) < u < g˜−1(β)}du
=
1
‖w‖E
[
min(g˜−1(β), w>xs + b)−max(g˜−1(α), w>xr + b)
]
.
(14)
Further, if [α, β] is contained in [g01(xr), g01(xs)], we have g˜−1(β) < g˜−1(g01(xs)) = g˜−1(g˜(w>xs + b)) =
w>xs + b, and similarly, g˜−1(α) > w>xr + b, and thus
Θ(f, α, β) = (g˜−1(β)− g˜−1(α))/‖w‖. (15)
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
The conclusion holds if ‖xr − xs‖
∫ 1
0
I{α < gij(x(t)) < β}dt equals the `2 distance from xr to its projection
Proj(x, j) for α = 0 and β = 1. Note that when x = xs, gij(x) = 0, because xs = Proj(xr, j). From
the definition of projection, i.e., Proj(x, j) = arg minx′∈S(ix,j) ‖x′ − x‖, we have that for all points x
on the segment from xr to xs, xs is only point with gij(x) = 0. Otherwise, xs is not the projection.
Therefore, all points x on the segment satisfy gij(x) > 0 = α. Since f is the output after the softmax layer,
gij(x) = f(x)i− f(x)j < 1 = β. Thus, the indicator function on the left-hand-side of (4) takes value 1 always,
and the integration reduces to calculating the distance from xr to xs.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
We rewrite the definition of T (u) as
T (u) := min
v s.t. ‖v‖=u and yiv>xi≥1,∀i
Cosine Similarity(v, w∗), (16)
where
Cosine Similarity(v, w∗) := |v>w∗|/(‖v‖ · ‖w∗‖). (17)
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To prove T (u) is a non-increasing function in u, we consider arbitrary u1, u2 so that u1 > u2 ≥ ‖w∗‖, and we
prove T (u1) ≤ T (u2).
First, consider T (u2). Denote by w2 the linear classifier that achieves the minimum value in the RHS of
(16) when u = u2. From definition, u2 = ‖w2‖. Now, if we increase the norm of w2 to obtain a new classifier
w1 =
u1
u2
w2, it still satisfies the constraint yiw1xi ≥ 1,∀i because
yiw1xi =
u1
u2
yiw2xi ≥ u1
u2
> 1. (18)
Thus, w1 = u1u2w2 satisfies the constraints in (16) for u = ‖w1‖ = u1, and being a linear scaling of w2, it has
the same cosine similarity score with w? (17), which means the worst-case tilting T (u1) should be smaller or
equal to the tilting of w1.
B.4 Proof of Proposition A.1
We can rewrite (7) using
Θ(f, α, β) :=
∑
(xi,xj) s.t. yi 6=yj
Θ1D(f, α, β, xr, xs), (19)
where Θ1D(f, α, β, xr, xs) denotes the thickness measured on a single segment, i.e.,
Θ1D(f, α, β, xr, xs) := ‖xr − xs‖
∫
t∈[0,1]
I{α < g01(x(t)) < β}dt, (20)
where recall that g01(x) = f(x)0 − f(x)1 and x(t) = txr + (1− t)xs.
Since the proposition is stated for the sum on all pairs of data, we can focus on the proof of an arbitrary
pair of data (xr, xs) such that yr 6= ys.
Consider any 2D decision function f(x) = [f(x)0, f(x)1] such that f(x)0 + f(x)1 = 1 (i.e., f(x) is a
probability mass function). In the following, we consider the restriction of f(x) on a segment (xr, xs),
which we denote as f(xr,xs)(x). Then, the proof relies on the following lemma, which states that the linear
interpolation scheme in mixup training does maximize the boundary thickness on the segment.
Lemma B.1. For any arbitrary fixed integer c > 0, the linear function
flin(txr + (1− t)xs) = [t, 1− t], t ∈ [0, 1], (21)
defined for a given segment (xr, xs) optimizes Θ1D(f, α, β, xr, xs) in (20) in the following minimax sense,
flin(x) = arg max
f(xr,xs)(x)
min
(α,β)
Θ1D(f(xr,xs)(x), α, β, xr, xs), (22)
where the maximization is over all the 2D functions f(xr,xs)(x) = [f(xr,xs)(x)0, f(xr,xs)(x)1] such that the
domain is restricted to the segment (xr, xs) and such that f(xr,xs)(x)0, f(xr,xs)(x)1 ∈ [0, 1] and f(xr,xs)(x)0 +
f(xr,xs)(x)1 = 1 for all x on the segment, and the minimization is taken over all pairs of α, β ∈ (−1, 1) such
that β − α = 1/c.
Proof. See Section B.5 for the proof.
Now, Proposition A.1 follows directly from Lemma B.1.
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B.5 Proof of Lemma B.1
In this proof, we simplify the notation and use f(x) to denote f(xr,xs)(x) which represents f(x) restricted to
the segment (xr, xs). This simple notation does not cause any confusion because we restrict to the segment
(xr, xs) in this proof.
We can simplify the proof by viewing the optimization over functions f(x) on the fixed segment (xr, xs)
as optimizing over the functions h(t) = f(x(t))1 − f(x(t))0 on t ∈ [0, 1], where x(t) = txr + (1− t)xs.
Thus, we only need to find the function f(x), when viewed as a one-dimensional function h(t) =
f(x(t))1 − f(x(t))0 = f(txr + (1− t)xs)1 − f(txr + (1− t)xs)0, that solves the minimax problem (22) for the
thickness defined as:
Θ1D(f(t)) =‖xr − xs‖
∫
t∈[0,1]
I{α < h(t) < β}dt
=‖xr − xs‖|h−1((α, β))|,
(23)
where h−1 is the inverse function of h(t). Note that h−1((α, β)) ⊂ [0, 1]. To prove the result, we only need to
prove that the linear function hlin(t) = 2t− 1, which is obtained from h(t) = f(txr + (1− t)xs)1 − f(txr +
(1− t)xs)0 for flin(txr + (1− t)xs) = [t, 1− t] defined in (21), solves the minimax problem
arg max
h(t)
min
(α,β)
Θ1D(h(t)) = arg max
h(t)
min
(α,β)
|h−1((α, β))|, (24)
where the maximization is taken over all h(t), and the minimization is taken over all pairs of α, β ∈ (−1, 1)
such that β − α = 1/c, for a fixed integer c > 1.
Now we prove a stronger statement.
Stronger statement:
min
(α,β)
|h−1((α, β))| ≤ β − α
2
, (25)
when the minimization is taken over all α, β such that α − β = 1/c, and for any measurable function
h(t) : [0, 1]→ [−1, 1].
If we can prove this statement, then, since hlin(t) = 2t−1 always achieves h−1((α, β)) = β+12 − α+12 = β−α2 ,
it is indeed the minimax solution of (24).
We prove the stronger statement above by contradiction. Suppose that the statement is not true, i.e., for
any α and β such that β − α = 1/c, we always have
|h−1((α, β))| > β − α
2
=
1
2c
. (26)
Then, the pre-image of [−1, 1] satisfies
1 ≥|h−1([−1, 1])|
=
c∑
i=−c+1
∣∣∣∣h−1(( i− 1c , ic )
)∣∣∣∣
(a)
>2c · 1
2c
= 1,
(27)
where the last inequality holds because of the inequality (26). This is clearly a contradiction, which means
that the stronger statement is true.
C A Chessboard Toy Example
In this section, we use a chessboard example in low dimensions to show that nonrobustness arises from
thin boundaries. Being a toy setting, this is limited in the generality, but it can visually demonstrate our
main message.
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2D chessboard data 2D classifier
3D Robust classifier 3D Non-robust classifier
Front view Top-down view Front view Top-down view
Interpolation between robust and non-robust classifier
Figure 6: Chessboard toy example. The 3D visualizations above use the color map that ranges from
yellow (value 1) to purple (value 0) to illustrate the predicted probability Pr(y = 1|x) ∈ [0, 1] in binary
classification. Each 3D figure draws 17 level sets of different colors from 0 to 1.
First row: The 2D chessboard dataset with two classes and a 2D classifier that learns the correct pattern.
Second row: 3D visualization of decision boundaries of two different classifiers. (left) A classifier that uses
robust x and y directions to classify, which preserves the complex chessboard pattern (see the top-down view
which contains a chessboard pattern.) (right) A classifier that uses the non-robust direction z to classify.
When the separable space on the non-robust direction is large enough, the thin boundary squeezes in and
generates a simple but non-robust function.
Third row: Visulization of the decision boundary as we interpolate between the robust and non-robust
classifiers. There is a sharp transition from the fourth to the fifth figure.
In Figure 6, the two subfigures shown on the first row represent the chessboard dataset and a robust 2D
function that correctly classifies the data. Then, we project the 2D chessboard data to a 100-dimensional
space by padding noise to each 2D point. In this case, the neural network can still learn the chessboard
pattern and preserve the robust decision boundary (see the 3D top-down view on the left part of the second
row which contains the chessboard pattern).
However, if we randomly perturb each square of samples in the chessboard in the 3rd dimension (the z
axis) to change the space between these squares, such that the boundary has enough space on the z-axis to
partition the two opposite classes, the boundary changes to a non-robust one instead (see the right part on
the second row of Figure 6). The shift value on the z axis is 0.05 which is much smaller than the distance
between two adjacent squares, which is 0.6. The data are not linearly separable on the z-axis because each
square on the chessboard is randomly shifted up or down independently of other squares.
A more interesting result can be obtained by varying the shift on the z axis from 0.01 to 0.08. See the
third row of Figure 6. The network undergoes a sharp transition from using robust decision boundaries to
using non-robust ones. This is consistent with the main message shown in Figure 1, i.e., that neural networks
tend to generate thin and non-robust boundaries to fit in the narrow space between opposite classes on the
non-robust direction, while a thick boundary mitigates this effect. On the third row, from left to right, the
expanse of the data on z-axis increases, allowing the network to use only the z-axis to classify.
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gij(x)=α gij(x)=β
gij(x)<α
gij(x)>βboundarytilting
xr
xs
gradient
direction
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Thickness and boundary tilting. (a) The cosine similarity between the gradient direction and
xs − xr generalizes the measurement of “boundary tilting” to nonlinear functions. (b) Boundary tilting can
be mitigated by using a thick decision boundary.
Details of 3D figure generation: For the visualization in Figure 6, each 3D figure is generated by
plotting 17 consecutive level sets of neural network prediction values (after the softmax layer) from 0 to
1. The prediction on each level set is the same, and each level set is represented by a colored continuous
surface in the 3D figure. The yellow end of the color bar represents a function value of 1, and the purple end
represents 0. The visualization is displayed in a 3D orthogonal subspace of the whole input space. The three
axes are the first three vectors in the natural basis. They represent the x and y directions that contain the
chessboard pattern, and the z axis that contains the direction of shift values.
Details of the chessboard toy example: The chessboard data contains 2 classes of 2D points arranged
in 9× 9 = 81 squares. Each square contains 100 randomly generated 2D points uniformly distributed in the
square. The length of each square is 0.4, and the separation between two adjacent squares is 0.6. The shift
direction (up or down) and value on the z-axis are the same for all 2D points in a single square, and the shift
value is much smaller than 1 (which is the distance between the centers of two squares). See the third row on
Figure 6 for different shift values ranging from 0.01 to 0.08. The shift value is, however, independent across
different squares, i.e., these squares cannot be easily separated by a linear classifier using information on
the z-axis only. The classifier is a neural network with 9 fully-connected layers and a residual link on each
layer. The training has 100 epochs, an initial learning rate of 0.003, batch size 128, weight decay 5e-4, and
momentum 0.9.
D A Thick Boundary Mitigates Boundary Tilting
In this section, we generalize the observation of Proposition 2.3 to nonlinear classifiers. Recall that in
Proposition 2.3, we use Cosine Similarity (w,w∗) = |w>w∗|/(‖w‖ · ‖w∗‖) between the classifier w and the
max-margin classifier w∗ to measure boundary tilting. To measure boundary tilting in the nonlinear case,
we use x1 − x2 of random sample pairs (x1, x2) from the training set to replace the normal direction of the
max-margin solution w∗, and use ∇gij(x) = ∇(f(x)i − f(x)j) to replace the normal direction of a linear
classifier w, where i, j are the predicted labels of x1 and x2, respectively, and x is a random point on the line
segment (x1, x2). Then, the cosine similarity generalizes to
Average Cosine Similarity = E(x1,x2)∼training distribution s.t. i 6=j
[ |〈x1 − x2,∇xgij(x)〉|
‖x1 − x2‖‖∇xgij(x)‖
]
. (28)
In Figure 7a, we show the intuition underlying the use of (28). The smaller the cosine similarity is, the
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more severe the impact of boundary tilting becomes.
We also measure boundary tilting in various settings of adversarial training, and we choose the same set
of hyper-parameters that are used to generate Figure 3. See the results in Figure 7b. When measuring cosine
similarity, we average the results over 6400 training sample pairs. From the results shown in Figure 7b, a
thick boundary mitigates boundary tilting by increasing the cosine similarity.
E Additional Experiments on Non-adversarial Training
In this section, we provide more details and additional experiments extending the results of Section 3.1 on
non-adversarially trained neural networks. We demonstrate that a thick boundary improves OOD robustness
when the thickness is measured using different choices of hyper-parameters. We also show that the same
conclusion holds on two other datasets, namely CIFAR100 and SVHN, in addition to CIFAR10 used in the
main paper.
E.1 Details of measuring boundary thickness
Boundary thickness is calculated by integrating on the segments that connect a sample with its corresponding
adversarial sample. We find the adversarial sample by using an `2 PGD attack of size 1.0, step size 0.2, and
number of attack steps 20. We measure both thickness and margin on the normalized images in CIFAR10, which
introduces a multiplicity factor of approximately 5 when using the standard deviations (0.2023, 0.1994, 0.2010),
respectively, for the RGB channels compared to measuring thickness on unnormalized images.
To compute the integral in (1), we connect the segment from xr to xs and evaluate the neural network
response on 128 evenly spaced points on the segment. Then, we compute the cumulative `2 distance of
the parts on this segment for which the prediction value is between (α, β), which measures the distance
between two level sets gij(x) = α and gij(x) = β on this segment (see equation (1)). Finally, we report
the average thickness obtained by repeated runs on 320 segments, i.e., 320 random samples with their
adversarial examples.
E.2 Comparing different measuring methods: tradeoff between complexity and
accuracy
In this part, we discuss the choice of distribution p when selecting segments (xr, xs) to measure thickness.
Recall that in the main paper, we choose xs as an adversarial example of xr. Another way, which is
computationally cheaper, is to measure thickness on the segment directly between pairs of samples in the
training dataset, i.e., sample xr randomly from the training data, and sample xs as a random data point
with a different label.
Although computationally cheaper, this way of measuring boundary thickness is more prone to the
“boundary-tilting” effect, because the connection between a pair of samples is not guaranteed to be orthogonal
to the decision boundary. Thus, the boundary tilting effect can inflate the value of boundary thickness. This
effect only happens when we measure thickness on pairs of samples instead of measuring it in the adversarial
direction, which we have shown to be able to mitigate boundary tilting when the thickness is large (see
Section D).
In Figure 8, we show how this method affects the measurement of thickness. The thickness is measured
for the same set of models and training procedures as those shown in Figure 2a, but on random segments
that connect pairs of samples. We use α = 0 and β = 0.75 to match Figure 2a. In Figure 8, although the
trend remains the same (i.e., mixup>normal>training without weight decay), all the measurement values
of boundary thickness become much bigger than that of Figure 2a, indicating boundary tilting in all the
measured networks.
Remark 4 (An Oscillating 1D Example Motivates the Adversarial Direction). Obviously, the distribution
p in Definition 1 is vital in dictating robustness. Similar to Remark 2, one can consider an example of 2D
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Figure 8: Thickness on random sample pairs. Measuring the boundary thickness in the same experimental
setting as Figure 2a, but on pairs of random samples. The trend that mixup > normal training > training
without weight decay remains the same.
(a) Results on CIFAR10 with a large attack  = 2.0
(b) Results on CIFAR10 with a small attack  = 0.6
Figure 9: Ablation study on different attack sizes. Re-implementing the measurements in Figure 2a
using a larger or a smaller adversarial attack.
piece-wise linear mapping f(x) = [f(x)0, f(x)1] on a segment (xr, xs) that oscillates between the response
[0, 1] and [1, 0]. If one measures the thickness on this particular segment, the measured thickness remains the
same if the number of oscillations increases in the piece-wise linear mapping, but the robustness reduces with
more oscillations. Thus, the example motivates the measurement on the direction of an adversarial attack,
because an adversarial attack tends to find the closest “peak” or “valley” and can thus faithfully recover the
correct value of boundary thickness unaffected by the oscillation.
E.3 Ablation study
In this section, we provide an extensive ablation study on the different choices of hyper-parameters used
in the experiments. We show that our main conclusion about the positive correlation between robustness
and thickness remains the same for a wide range of hyper-parameters obviating the need to fine-tune these.
We study the adversarial attack direction used to measure thickness, the parameters α and β, as well as
reproducing the results on two other datasets, namely CIFAR100 and SVHN, in addition to CIFAR10.
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E.3.1 Different choices of adversarial attack in measuring boundary thickness
To measure boundary thickness on the adversarial direction, we have to specify a way to implement the
adversarial attack. To generate Figure 2a, we used `2 attack with attack range  =1.0, step size 0.2, and
number of attack steps 20. We show that the results and more importantly our conclusions do not change by
perturbing  a little. See Figure 9 and compare it with the corresponding results presented in Figure 2a. We
see that the change in the size of the adversarial attack does not alter the trend. However, the measured
thickness value does shrink if the  becomes too small, which is expected.
E.3.2 Different choices of α and β in measuring boundary thickness
(a) Results on CIFAR10 for α = 0 and β = 0.9
(b) Results on CIFAR10 for α = 0 and β = 0.8
(c) Results on CIFAR10 for α = 0 and β = 0.7
(d) Results on CIFAR10 for α = 0 and β = 0.6
Figure 10: Ablation study on different α and β. Re-implementing the measurements in Figure 2a for
different choices of α and β in Eqn.(1).
In this subsection, we present an ablation study on the choice of hyper-parameters α’s and β in (1). We
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show that the conclusions in Section 3.1 remain unchanged for a wide range of choices of α and β. See Figure
10. From the results, we can see that the trend remains the same, i.e., mixup>normal training>training
without weight decay. However, when α and β become close to each other, the magnitude of boundary
thickness also reduces, which is expected.
Remark 5 (Choosing the Best hyper-parameters). From Proposition 2.2, we know that the margin has
particular values of the hyper-parameters α = 0 and β = 1. Allowing different values of these hyper-
parameters allows us the flexibility to better capture the robustness than margin. The best choices of these
hyper-parameters might be different for different neural networks, and ideally one could do small validation
based studies to tune these hyper-parameters, but our ablation study in this section shows that for a large
regime of values, the exact search for the best choices is not required. We noticed, for example, setting α = 0
and β = 0.75 works well in practice, and much better than the standard definition of margin that has been
equated to robustness in past studies.
Remark 6 (Choosing Asymmetric α and β). We use asymmetric parameters α = 0 and β > 0 mainly
because, due to symmetry, the measured thickness when (α, β) = (0, x) is half in expectation of that when
(α, β) = (−x, x).
We have discussed alternative ways of adversarial attacks to measure boundary thickness on sample pairs
in Section E.2. For completeness, we also do an ablation study for choice of hyper-parameters α and β for
this case. The results in Figure 11, and this study also reinforces the same conclusion – that the particular
choice of α, β matters less than the fact that they are not set to 0 and 1 respectively.
E.3.3 Additional datasets
We repeat the experiments in Section 3.1 on two more datasets, namely CIFAR100 and SVHN. See Figure 12.
In this figure, we used the same experimental setting as in Section 3.1, except that we train with a different
initial learning rate 0.01 on SVHN, following convention. We reach the same conclusion as in Section 3.1, i.e.,
that mixup increases boundary thickness, while training without weight decay reduces boundary thickness.
E.4 Visualizing neural network boundaries
In this section, we show a qualitative comparison between a neural network trained using mixup and another
one trained in a standard way without mixup. See Figure 13. In the left figure, we can see that different level
sets are spaced apart, while the level sets in the right figure are hardly distinguishable. Thus, the mixup
model has a larger boundary thickness than the naturally trained model for this setting.
For the visualization shown in Figure 13, we use 17 different colors to represent the 17 level sets. The
origin represents a randomly picked CIFAR10 image. The x-axis represents a direction of adversarial
perturbation found using the projected gradient descent method [6]. The y-axis and the z-axis represent two
random directions that are orthogonal to the x perturbation direction. Each CIFAR10 input image has been
normalized using standard routines during training, e.g., using the standard deviations (0.2023, 0.1994, 0.2010),
respectively, for the RGB channels, so the scale of the figure may not represent the true scale in the original
space of CIFAR10 input images.
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(a) Results on CIFAR10 for α = 0 and β = 0.9
(b) Results on CIFAR10 for α = 0 and β = 0.8
(c) Results on CIFAR10 for α = 0 and β = 0.7
(d) Results on CIFAR10 for α = 0 and β = 0.6
Figure 11: Ablation study on different α and β for thickness measured on random sample pairs.
Re-implementing the measurements in Figure 8 for different choices of α and β in Eqn.(1).
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(a) Results on CIFAR100
(b) Results on SVHN
Figure 12: Ablation study on more datasets. Re-implementing the measurements in Figure 2a on for
two other datasets CIFAR100 and SVHN.
Mixup Standard training
Figure 13: Visualization of mixup. A mixup model has a thicker boundary than the same model trained
using standard setting, because the level sets represented by different colors are more separate in mixup than
the standard case.
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F Additional Experiments on Adversarial Training
In this section, we provide additional details and analyses for the experiments in Section 3.2 on adversarially
trained neural networks. We demonstrate that a thick boundary improves adversarial robustness for wide
range of hyper-parameters, including those used during adversarial training and those used to measure
boundary thickness.
F.1 Details of experiments in Section 3.2
We use ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10 for all the experiments in Section 3.2. We first choose a standard setting
that trains with learning rate 0.1, no learning rate decay, weight decay 5e-4, attack range  = 8 pixels, 10
iterations for each attack, and 2 pixels for the step-size. Then, for each set of experiments, we change one
parameter based on the standard setting. We tune the parameters to achieve a natural training accuracy
larger than 90%. For the experiment on early stopping, we use a learning rate 0.01 instead of 0.1 to achieve
90% training accuracy. We train the neural network for 400 epochs without learning rate decay to filter out
the effect of early stopping. The results with learning rate decay and early stopping are reported in Section
F.2 which show the same trend.
When measuring boundary thickness, we select segments on the adversarial direction, and we find the
adversarial direction by using an `2 PGD attack of size  = 2.0, step size 0.2, and number of attack steps 20.
Changed parameter Learning rate Weight decay L1 Cutout Early stopping
Learning rate 3e-3 5e-4 0 0 None
1e-2 5e-4 0 0 None
3e-2 5e-4 0 0 None
Weight decay 1e-1 0e-4 0 0 None
1e-1 1e-4 0 0 None
L1 1e-1 0 5e-7 0 None
1e-1 0 2e-6 0 None
1e-1 0 5e-6 0 None
Cutout 1e-1 0 0 4 None
1e-1 0 0 8 None
1e-1 0 0 12 None
1e-1 0 0 16 None
Early stopping 1e-2 5e-4 0 0 50
1e-2 5e-4 0 0 100
1e-2 5e-4 0 0 200
1e-2 5e-4 0 0 400
Table 2: Hyper-parameters in Section 3.2. The table reports the hyper-parameters used to obtain the
results in Figure 3a and 3b for adversarial training.
Note that boundary thickness indeed increases with heavier regularization or data augmentation. See
Figure 14 on the thickness of the models trained with the parameters reported in Table 2.
F.2 Adversarial training with learning rate decay
In this section, we reimplement the experiments shown in Figure 3a and 3b but with learning rate decay and
early stopping, which is reported by [30] to improve the robust accuracy of adversarial training. We still use
ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10. However, instead of training for 400 epochs, we train for only 120 epochs, with a
learning rate decay of 0.1 at epoch 100. The adversarial training still uses 8-pixel PGD attack with 10 steps
and step size 2 pixel.
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Figure 14: Regularization and data augmentation increase thickness. The five commonly used
regularization and data augmentation schemes studied in Section 3.2 all increase boundary thickness.
(a) (b)
Figure 15: Adversarial training with learning rate decay. Reimplementing the experimental protocols
that obtained Figure 3 using learning rate decay. The hyper-parameters are shown in Table 3
The set of training hyper-parameters that we use are shown in Table 3. Similar to Figure 3, we tune
hyper-parameters such that the training accuracy on natural data reaches 90%. The results are reported
in Figure 15. We do not separately test early stopping because all experiments follow the same early
stopping procedure.
F.3 Different choices of the hyper-parameters in measuring adversarially trained
networks
Here, we study the connection between boundary thickness and robustness under different choices of
hyperparameters used to measure thickness. Specifically, we use three different sets of hyper-parameters
to reimplement the experiments that obtained Figure 3a and Figure 3b. These parameters are provided in
Table 4. The first row represents the base parameters used in Figure 3a and Figure 3b. Then, the second
row changes β. The third and the fourth row change the attack size  and step size. The changes in the
hyper-parameters maintains our conclusion regarding the relationship between thickness and robustness. See
Figure 16.
G More Details of Noisy-mixup
In this section, we provide more details for the experiments on noisy mixup. In the experiments, we use
ResNet-18 on both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. For OOD, we use the datasets from [31] and evaluate on 15
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 16: Ablation study on adversarially trained networks. Re-implementing the measurements in
Figure 3 for three other different choices of α, β and the attack size . The parameters are provided in Table
4. For all settings, robustness still increases with thickness.
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Changed parameter Learning rate Weight decay L1 Cutout Early stopping
Learning rate 1e-2 5e-4 0 0 120
3e-2 5e-4 0 0 120
1e-1 5e-4 0 0 120
Weight decay 1e-1 0e-4 0 0 120
1e-1 1e-4 0 0 120
1e-1 5e-4 0 0 120
L1 1e-1 0 5e-7 0 120
1e-1 0 2e-6 0 120
1e-1 0 5e-6 0 120
Cutout 1e-1 0 0 4 120
1e-1 0 0 8 120
1e-1 0 0 12 120
Table 3: Hyper-parameter settings in Figure 15.
Figures α β Attack  Number of steps Step size
Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b
(the base setting in
the main paper)
0 0.75 2.0 20 0.2
Fig. 16a and 16b 0 0.5 2.0 20 0.2
Fig. 16c and 16d 0 0.75 1.0 20 0.1
Fig. 16e and 16f 0 0.75 0.6 20 0.06
Table 4: Hyper-parameter settings in Figure 16.
different types of corruptions in CIFAR10-C and CIFAR100-C, including noise, blur, weather, and digital
corruption.
The probability to replace a clean image with a noise image is 0.5. The model is trained for 200 epochs,
and learning rate decay with a factor of 10 at epochs 100 and 150, respectively. For both mixup and noisy
mixup, we train using three learning rates 0.1, 0.03, 0.01 and report the best results. The weight decay is
set to be 1e-4, which follows the recommendation in [16]. For noisy mixup, each pixel in a noise image is
sampled independently from a standard Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, and processed
using the same standard training image transforms applied on the ordinary image inputs.
When testing the robustness of the ordinary mixup and noisy mixup models, we used both black/white-box
attacks and OOD samples. For white-box attack, we use an `∞ PGD attack with 20 steps. The attack size 
can take values in 8-pixel (0.031), 6-pixel (0.024) and 4-pixel (0.0157), respectively. The step size is 1/10
of the attack size . For black-box attacks, we use ResNet-110 to generate the transfer attack. The other
parameters are the same with the 8-pixel white-box attack.
H More Details of the Experiment on Non-robust Features in Sec-
tion 4.2
In this part, we provide more details of the experiment on non-robust features. First, we discuss the
background on the discovery in [33]. Using a dataset Dtrain = {(xi, yi)}ni=1, Dtest and a C-class neural network
classifier f , a new dataset D′ is generated as follows:
• (attack-and-relabel) Generate an adversarial example x′i from each training sample xi such that the
prediction of the neural network y′i = arg maxj∈{1,2,...,C} f(x′i)j is not equal to yi. Then, label the new
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sample x′i as y′i. The target class y′i can either be a fixed value for each class yi, or a random class that
is different from yi. In this paper, we use random target classes.
• (test-on-clean-data) Train a new classifier f ′ on the new dataset D′ = {(x′i, y′i)}ni=1, evaluate on the
original clean testset Dtest, and obtain a test accuracy ACC.
The observation in [33] is that by training on the completely mislabeled dataset D′ = {(x′i, y′i)}ni=1, the
new classifier f ′ still achieves a high ACC on Dtest. The explanation in [33] is that each adversarial example
x′ contains “non-robust features” of the target label y′i, which are useful for generalization, and ACC measures
the reliance on these non-robust features. The test accuracy ACC obtained in this way is the generalization
accuracy reported in Figure 5b.
In Figure 5b, the x-axis means different epochs in training a source model. Each error bar represents the
variance of non-robust feature scores measured in 8 repeated runs. Thus, each point in this figure represents 8
runs of the same procedures of a non-robust feature experiment for a different source network, and each curve
in Figure 5b contains multiple experiments using different source networks, instead of a single training-testing
round. It is interesting to see that source networks trained for different number of epochs can achieve different
non-robust feature scores, which suggests that when the decision boundary changes between epochs, the
properties of the non-robust features also change.
In the experiments to generate Figure 5b, we use a ResNet56 model as the source network, and a ResNet20
model as the target network. These two ResNet models are standard for classification tasks on CIFAR10.
The source network is trained for 500 epochs, with an initial learning rate of 0.1, weight decay 5e-4, and
learning rate decay 0.1 respectively at epoch 150, 300, and 450. When training with a small learning rate,
the initial learning rate is set as 0.003. When training with mixup, the weight decay is 1e-4, following the
initial setup in [16]. The adversarial attack uses PGD with 100 iterations, an `2 attack range of  = 2.0, and
an attack stepsize of 0.4.
Remark 7 (Why Thick Boundaries Reduce Non-robust Features). Our explanation on why a thick boundary
reduces non-robust feature score is that a thicker boundary is potentially more “complex”3. Then, in the
attack-and-relabel step, the adversarial perturbations are generated in a relatively “random” way, independent
of the true data distribution, making the “non-robust features” preserved by adversarial examples disappear.
Studying the inner mechanism of the generation of non-robust features and the connection to boundary
thickness is a meaningful future work.
3Note that, although various complexity measures are associated with generalization in classical theory, and the inductive
bias towards simplicity may explain generalization of neural networks [27, 28], it has been pointed out that simplicity may be at
odds with robustness [26].
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